Block 4 · Lesson 31 · Where We Left Off
Three blocks, three toolkits: B1 the threat's physics, B2 the RF fight, B3 the signatures.
Today we put one number on the whole engagement, then on the whole route, so the three toolkits can finally be compared on one scale.
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · Objectives
By the end of this lesson, you will be able to:
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · Roadmap
One capstone, built a lesson at a time — the Final Project is issued today.
| Lesson | What it adds to the Final Project |
|---|---|
| L31 · PK chain | the survival metric — per-site chain to route $P_S$ (T2) · today |
| L32 · Threat geometry | the threat map — detection contours, MEZ and LEZ (T1) |
| L33 · Info geometry | their track on you — the passive network's error along your route (T4) |
| L34 · Path planning | the route — Dijkstra on a risk graph, and the fuel-limited choice (T3) |
| L35 · Fusion | the pop-up threat — localize it on the next leg (T6) · checkpoint |
| L36 · SEAD & SOJ | the support package — a standoff jammer and one SEAD nomination (T5) |
| L37 · Modern trends | limitations and future threats |
| L38–L41 | work day, peer review, revision, the final paper |
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · Survivability
Ball: survivability is the ability to avoid or withstand a hostile environment.
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · The PK Chain
Each link is conditional: the chance it succeeds, given every link before it did.
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · The PK Chain
L31_PKChain.m
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · The Levers
| Link | Levers you already own | Block |
|---|---|---|
| Detect · $P_D$ | range law and threshold; RCS, IR signature, EMCON; noise jamming | B1 · B3 · B2 |
| Track · $P_{T|D}$ | deception jamming, chaff, the Doppler notch | B2 · B1 |
| Identify · $P_{I|T}$ | emission discipline — give them nothing to classify | B2 · B3 |
| Engage · $P_{H|I}$ | flares, DIRCM, towed decoys, seeker-aware tactics | B3 · B2 |
| Kill · $P_{K|H}$ | airframe design — Ball's vulnerability toolkit, named but not taught | — |
| Exposure · shots | route, standoff jamming, SEAD — how often the chain runs | B4 |
Block 4 adds no new link. It decides how many times the threat gets to run the chain.
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · The Levers
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · The Mission
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · The Mission
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · Quick Exercise
Type this with me — one chain, a menu of four levers, then three encounters.
% L31 -- the chain is a product; risk is a sum
p = [0.9 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.6]; % P_D P_T|D P_I|T P_H|I P_K|H
fprintf('%-9s P_S = %.3f\n', 'baseline', 1 - prod(p));
nm = {'RAM','deception','flares','armor'};
k = [1 2 4 5]; % the link each lever cuts
v = [0.6 0.6 0.3 0.45]; % that link's new value
for i = 1:4
q = p; q(k(i)) = v(i);
fprintf('%-9s P_S = %.3f\n', nm{i}, 1 - prod(q));
end
PKi = [prod(p) 0.12 0.06]; % three independent encounters
r = -log(1 - PKi); % risk of each encounter
fprintf('P_S = %.3f -ln P_S = %.3f sum(r) = %.3f\n', ...
prod(1 - PKi), -log(prod(1 - PKi)), sum(r));
Which lever wins — and what do the winners have in common?
Then: deception and armor tie, on different links. What would halving each link do?
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · Quick Problem
A notional penetrator crosses three layered SAMs and takes one independent shot from each.
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · Exposure
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · Final Project
Individual, 20%, in lieu of a final exam: route a B-21 through an integrated threat, then write it up as an IEEE journal paper.
| When | What is due |
|---|---|
| L31 · today | Issued: the handout, the scenario files, the toolkit, and the IEEE template |
| L35 | Checkpoint, required, feedback only: approach, T1 figure, lessons to cite |
| L38 | Work day |
| L39 | Complete draft at the start of class; peer review #1 in class |
| Before L40 | Peer review #2 |
| L40 | Revision work day |
| L41 | Final paper, response to reviewers, code, AI transcripts |
AI may typeset your paper and point out errors; the words and judgments are yours. Full rules in the handout.
Block 4 · Lesson 31 · Wrap-Up